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For strategic, financial, and other reasons, merger and acquisition (M&A) is popular and 
widely conducted by firms worldwide. However, not always can an acquiring firm achieve its 
preferred outcome. Typical reasons behind failed cases are dissimilarity of the businesses, weak 
integration, improper strategy after acquisitions. Driven by the desire to achieve favorable outcomes 
of acquisitions, researchers have been focused on understanding the factors behind acquisition 
performance. Among all possible factors, the impact of acquisition experiences is believed to be 
critical based on the behavioral learning theory. Nevertheless, researches on M&A performance do not 
reach consensus results. With different geographic locations, time span, and industry focus, the effect 
of acquisition experiences was found to be positive, negative, not significant, U-shaped, and inverted 
U-shaped. Hence, it is essential to retest the topic with more updated data.  
This study attempts to deeply understand the relationship between acquisition experiences and 
acquisition performances of Taiwanese listed acquirers, then, may enhance understanding of 
organization experience effects. Centering on the effect of acquisition experiences, three sets of 
hypotheses are developed in the current thesis. To be specific, these three hypotheses draw attention 
to the number of acquisition experiences, the similarity of prior acquisition experiences, and time 
interval between acquisition experiences and the focal acquisitions. 
To test the hypotheses, multiple regression analysis, a quantitative approach, is employed with 
 
 
the dependent being the performance of the focal acquisition, independent variables being acquisition 
experiences related factors, and control variables being seven variables commonly be taken into 
concern in previous studies. Through the sample data consisting of a total of 91 outbound merger and 
acquisition deals announced and closed by Taiwanese listed firms from 2015 to 2019, the current thesis 
found the impact of acquisition experiences and the time interval on acquisition performance are not 
significant. On the other hand, the impact of similarities of prior acquisitions is found to be 
significantly positive.  
The findings in the current thesis contribute to prior academic studies by providing one piece 
of the latest evidence from the firms in an emerging market, confirming the complexity of how firm 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Section 1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION     
Mergers and Acquisitions are major strategic initiatives that allow the firm to grow, gain access 
to valuable assets and know-how, redeploy existing capabilities to new and underexplored markets, 
and achieve competitive advantage (Haleblian, 2009). Evidence shows the volume of global 
acquisition activities has seen steady growth over the last decade (Massoudi, 2007). Along with the 
trend, merger and acquisition (M&A) has received considerable attention from academics and 
practitioners. While walking through previous empirical researches of M&A, several topics have 
already studied for other countries; for example, Australia, China, and the USA. However, relatively 
less attention has been paid to Taiwanese firms due to the size of economics.  
The number of M&A transactions in Taiwan has experienced a downward wave since 2015. In 
2019, the total value of announced M&A transactions was 6.96 billion USD, with a deal count of 171, 
while the total value of announced M&A transactions was 18.04 billion USD with a deal count of 314 
in 2018. As indicated above, there were fewer M&A transactions in 2019 than in 2018, and the total 
value decreased by 11.08 billion USD. Furthermore, the trend is expected to continue in 2020 because 
of the following reasons. 
Firstly, Taiwan is always a conservative investor in the market. According to the financial 
reports of Taiwanese public firms, it is realized that the amount of cash increased from 3.5 trillion 
NTD to 5 trillion NTD. At the same time, the liabilities rates decreased from 55.1% to 52.8% in 2015, 
showing the evidence that Taiwanese firms are more conservative in terms of the usage of the asset. 
Secondly, the government in Taiwan shows less support or encouragement toward M&A transactions 
except for the financial industry. The government pays more attention to the financial section since 
Taiwan has multiple domestic banks; however, none of them is big enough to compete with 
international banks. Therefore, the government in Taiwan focuses more on the integration among the 
financial industry. Thirdly, a lower Price to Earnings Ratio (P/E Ratio) makes Taiwan less competitive 
while activating M&A decisions. According to the data from SIBLIS Research, Taiwan’s P/E ratio was 
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around 19.57 on 2019/12/31, while the P/E ratio of the US was 30.01, and Japan was 23.0. Last but 
not least, Taiwanese firms are more interested in the transformation from the traditional industries than 
in investing through M&A transactions recently.  
Despite the smaller size and less value of Taiwanese M&A transactions, the current thesis 
believes that there are necessities to research on Taiwanese firms since different geographic locations, 
the timing of M&A, and industry focus may lead to different results. Therefore, developed from the 
suggestion that M&A experience is critical for enhancing the M&A performance stated by previous 
studies, the thesis intends to understand the relationship between M&A experiences and performances 
based on the more updated empirical evidence of Taiwanese firms.  
Section 2. DEFINITION AND CONCEPTS OF M&A 
Merger and Acquisition (M&A) is a process or a range of activities for two companies to 
combine their operations to achieve specific business or strategic objectives. These objectives may 
include expanding into new products or markets, reducing production or administrative costs, and 
adding new research and development capabilities to the combined company. (Roger Y.W. Tang, 2006)  
To define merger and acquisition separately, acquisition generally means a larger firm 
absorbing a smaller firm, with the smaller firm either becoming a subsidiary of the larger firm, or with 
the smaller firm combined into the larger firm, hence losing its identity, and the larger firm will take 
control of smaller firm’s assets and liabilities. On the other hand, a merger is generally used to reflect 
the consolidation of two companies on an equal status basis.  
In the business world, merger and acquisition are generally being used interchangeably and 
abbreviated as M&A. This is because merger and acquisition lead to the same outcome, whereby two 
entities become one entity. In reality, pure mergers or mergers on an equal basis do not happen very 
often. Instead, it is an acquisition that occurred most of the time. (Kotter and Schlesinger, 2009) 
Section 3. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF M&A 
This section reviews the historical trends of merger and acquisition (M&A) markets and traces 
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its expansion from the year 1985, including the data of Worldwide, United States, Japan, and Taiwan. 
All the figures are presented and discussed respectively in the following.  
1.3.1. Worldwide 
According to the statistics from The Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (IMAA), 
it shows that on a regional level, North America, the Asia-Pacific region, and Western Europe 
accounted for the majority of deal volume for the past 30 years. Moreover, the historical trend of M&A 
complies with the situation of economics. In other words, industry merger waves may be driven by 
economic developments or shocks. However, not all developments or shocks will lead to a merger 
wave; whether development or a shock leads to a merger wave depends on if there is sufficient overall 
capital liquidity presented. (Haleblian 2012)  
Figure 1. Number and Value of M&A Worldwide 
 
Source: The Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (IMAA) via www.imaa-institute.org 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the number and total value of M&A worldwide experience four 
waves. Since the 1980s, scholars have pointed out the growing size and overall dominance of corporate 
actors in the global political economy. As the global FDI stocks (as a percentage of world GDP) grew 
















































































transnational business communities started growing closer together, the emerging new world 
economic order was dubbed “transnational” or “global” capitalism. A key driver behind this 
accelerated corporate internationalization was the growing number of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). Therefore, the first wave was stimulated by the above reasons and happened 
between 1988 and 1990. The second wave occurred between 1998 and 2000 when firms began to 
believe M&A was a factor that increased their competitiveness. During the period, most M&A 
transactions were completed in either Atlantic or firms located in European countries. Besides, there 
also had an increase in foreign corporations acquiring Japanese domestic companies. (OECD 
Economic Outlook, 2000) The third wave occurred between 2006 and 2008 because of world trend in 
terms of the investment preferences had extended to M&A. After 2012, the M&A of worldwide trends 
highly similar to US trends, meaning that the developed countries play important roles in M&A. 
Following in this thesis, the historical trend in two developed countries, the United States and Japan, 
and in one developing country, Taiwan, will be shown.  
1.3.2. United States 
Figure 2. Number and Value of M&A in the United States 
 



















































































As the largest economy in the world, United States has more deals and higher total value in the 
history of M&A than other countries, at the same time influencing the M&A trends of other countries 
significantly. Based on the prior discussions, the historical trend of M&A in the United States would 
be divided into four periods and discussed. 
Period 1 (1985-1990): Before the 1980s, most M&A transactions consisted of a high number 
of diversifying takeovers, i.e., mergers between unrelated firms, that led to the development of large 
conglomerates. However, the conglomerate structures created had become inefficient that firms were 
forced to reorganize their businesses. This pattern led to the first wave after 1985, which focused on 
increased specialization.  
Period 2 (1990-2000): During the period, the M&A wave consisted of both horizontal and 
vertical M&A transactions that allowed organizations to compete in the globalizing market. Influenced 
by the privatization and regulatory change in the 1990s, this wave is considered as the first real 
international expansion of the US firms. Moreover, shareholders' value started to be taken in concern 
during the period.  
Period 3 (2000-2008): After the AOL transaction, one of the largest deals in history, firms 
started to focus on the strategic M&A in talent technology and consolidation of the “New Economy.” 
To particularly magnify the rise of M&A in general and mega-deals, the significant figure was revealed 
of the total value of M&A announced by U.S. acquirers in 2005 at US$1,245 billion, approximately 
10% of the country’s GDP. (Bao and Edmans, 2007) However, the wave came downward since the 
financial crisis happened in 2008.  
Period 4 (2008-Present): From 2014, optimism toward M&A started to return to the market. 
Researchers observe that the business environment after the 2008 crisis, characterized by risk aversion 
and a focus on firms’ organic growth, is vanishing. The current market is a more inconstant one in 
terms of market growth; however, firms are beginning to understand that this inconstant world is the 
new standard. After all, there will always be wars and countries with difficulty in honoring their 
sovereign debt payments. In such an environment, it may not be possible to rely only on organic growth 
and cost-cutting to deliver consistent financial results. Firms seem to be once again believing that it is 
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easier to buy extension rather than build it. (Deloitte, 2018) 
1.3.3. Japan 
M&A deals in Japan went through ups and downs since 1985 when the first recorded M&A 
operation occurred (June & Lomer, 2017), and peaked in 2018. In this sector, the historical trend of 
M&A in Japan would be divided into three periods and discussed.  
Figure 3. Number and Value of M&A in Japan 
 
Source: The Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (IMAA) via www.imaa-institute.org 
Period 1 (1985-1998): A strong Japanese economy categorize this period in terms of growth. 
Without enough experience of M&A, both the values and the numbers of the transactions were small. 
However, since Japanese firms experienced the financial bubble between 1988 to 1990, there was a 
small wave. From then on, having a considerable amount of cash enabled Japanese firms to start to 
invest via M&A decisions.  
Period 2 (1999-2008): A major M&A wave happened in Japan since the second half of the 
1990s. According to merger and acquisition (M&A) services provider, RECOF Co., the 15 trillion yen 
spent on takeovers in 2006 exceeded all R&D expenditures by Japanese companies. One explanation 














































































































designed to promote takeovers and, by fostering efficient capital reallocation, revitalize the economy. 
For example, since October 1999, the stock exchange has permitted the acquisition of all shares in a 
company in exchange for stock without the need for cash. Stock transfers also allow companies to 
establish a holding company to facilitate business combinations. Furthermore, since April 2001, 
companies have been permitted to transfer all or part of their business more speedily before they are 
substantially ruined. (Higgins and Beckman, 2006) 
Period 3 (2008-Present): After a long period of suffering a stagnant economy and the outlook 
of a population decline in the horizon, Japanese companies began to look outside for growth 
opportunities, in search of new markets and intellectual properties. This pattern has seen when cross 
border deals increase significantly, going over 50% of the overall value in 2012 and reaching new 
heights in 2018. The reason for this pattern is the relatively small impact the global financial crisis of 
2008 had on the investment power of Japanese companies compared with the rest of the world, which 
resulted in many struggling European and American firms being easy targets for Japanese companies 
(Suzuki, 2017).  
1.3.4. Taiwan 
                   Figure 4. Number and Value of M&A in Taiwan 



















































































Merger & acquisition in Taiwan are mainly regulated by the M&A Act, which governs the 
merger, share exchange, acquisition, and spin-off of a firm. The Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MOEA) is the competent authority. As mentioned, the size or the value of Taiwanese M&A cannot 
be comparable to most of the developed countries. However, some predictions believe that Taiwan has 
great potential in increasing the amount of M&A transactions in the future because the value of M&A 
in Taiwan only accounted for 0.3% of the world in the past. In this thesis, the historical trend of M&A 
in Taiwan would be divided into three periods and discussed.  
Period 1 (1985-1991): Taiwan experienced bubble economics at the end of the 1980s. Due to 
the structural transformation of the economy, the export rate of Taiwanese firms increased rapidly and 
stimulated economic growth in 1989. (Mai, Chao-Cheng, 2001) Hoping to increase competitiveness 
under international competition, Taiwanese firms saw M&A as a means of entering foreign markets 
and accessing foreign technology. (Hoesel, 1999) However, the wave went down soon after the bubble 
economics burst. 
Period 2 (1991-2008): As shown in Figure 4, the number of M&A transactions went through 
ups and downs during the period. Compliance with the worldwide M&A wave, firms in Taiwan tended 
to be more confident in expending via M&A, resulting in a growth of M&A transactions from 1999. 
Nevertheless, the value of M&A decreased rapidly in 2004 since the size of transactions were tend to 
be smaller during the time. In this period, M&A transactions reflected the predominance of specialized 
family-owned concerns in Taiwan’s economy.  
Period 3 (2008-Present): Same as the second period, the trend of M&A transactions went 
through ups and downs and peaked in 2015. During the period, Taiwan M&A trends tend to be highly 
influenced by the policy of the government. Take the situation after 2016 for example, although the 
amended M&A Act (2016) allows more flexibility for acquirers and it should become easier for 
acquirers to achieve 100% of equity interest from the acquisitions. However, due to the related political 
issues with other countries, both total numbers and the value of M&A transactions decreased from 
2015 to 2016. Furthermore, the trend is expected to continue in 2020.  
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Section 4. DRIVERS BEHIND M&A 
 Primary drivers for M&A are strategic reasons, varied from firm to firm, and transaction to 
transaction. Moreover, deals are often predicated upon multiple rationales. Galpin (2014) categorizes 
strategic drivers in eight Cs. One or any combination of these may serve as motivation for a company 
to pursue a particular transaction: Costs: to realize efficiencies of scale across duplicate functions; 
Channels: to gain new means of distribution, such as retail outlets, a direct sales force, or an internet 
presence; Content: to obtain new products or services; Capabilities: to gain new or augment current 
strengths, such as R&D, marketing, or technology; Customers: to obtain access to new customer 
segments, including lower, middle, or upper market purchasers; Countries: to gain entrance to various 
regions or countries in which they did not previously have a presence; Capital: to obtain available cash 
or access to capital markets that a target firm may possess; Capacity: to increase the available volume 
of operations.  
Existing researches also show that there are differences between M&A within the same 
industry and M&A where the acquiring firm operates in a different industry from the target firm. Due 
to the revenue enhancement and cost savings, such as the economics of scope in marketing, production, 
and logistics, the same industry M&As are assumed to be synergy-creating and value-creating. On the 
other hand, it is believed that besides strategic reasons, diversification, and conglomerate transactions 
take place when the acquirer is engaged in a field that is unrelated to the target. Sometimes, the buyer 
believes it has a set of strengths that can propel the acquiring firm’s business, and the transaction is 
thus part of a grand strategy to boost the buyer’s future. At other times, the acquiring firms seek to 
redeploy capital from its core business into another primary line, rather than disposing of the cash by 
paying higher dividends or repurchasing stock. (Jeffrey C. Hooke, 2015)  
Another driver is financial reasons. Private equity firms typically use a high level of debt and 
acquiring firms simply for financial returns. Furthermore, some argued that many acquisitions are, in 
fact, stock-market driven.  
Last but not least, weak corporate governance or corporate politics are also believed to be the 
drivers behind M&A. Sometimes managers in acquiring firms complete M&A mainly for their benefits. 
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By successfully closing M&A deals, those managers are likely to obtain higher compensation. Even 
though those M&A deals may not create value for the firm itself, managers in acquiring company, who 
intend to build their empire through M&A, will proceed to finish the transactions. (Ravenscraft, D., 
1987)  
Section 5. CHALLENGES OF M&A  
The previous section discussed several drivers for M&A. Unfortunately, extracting the 
maximum potential benefits from an acquisition is not easy (Caiazza & Volpe, 2015). Numerous 
studies over the years have proven that over half of acquisitions do not increase the buyer’s value. 
(Jeffrey C. Hooke, 2015) Moreover, cross-border M&A transactions are considered to be more difficult 
to generate synergy than domestic ones. This section aims to discuss the possible challenges of M&A 
by dividing them into four different categories, which are integration challenges, managerial 
challenges, target valuation challenges, and synergy realization challenges. 
1.5.1. Integration Challenges 
Although the integration process is seemed to happen after the closure of the M&A transaction, 
firms should start it before the deal is closed since the integration process is complex. Among 
challenges, while integrating two companies, it is believed to have two different types, task integration, 
and human integration. The two types are not independent of one another. (Uzelac et al., 2015) 
Challenges of task integration occur because the overall systems of two separate firms’ systems 
have to fit together. The two firms may have different original systems which are not easy to work 
together. Maybe one system has to be replaced to make integration work. In addition, duplicate 
functions might have to be removed, while technology, capabilities and intellectual capital might have 
to be increased (Caiazza & Volpe, 2015). Besides, some M&A cases would face the challenges of 
human integration, which emphasizes human satisfaction in both firms and the innovative atmosphere 
of mutual trust and respect (Birkinshaw et al., 2000). In the process of human integration, it is common 
to have tension, which will ultimately hurt the performance of the firms. Bouwman (2013) suggests 
that cultural differences are a significant causal factor regarding merger failures.  
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1.5.2. Managerial Challenges 
As mentioned before, the main driver of M&A is to generate synergy effects in multiple aspects. 
To make sure the creation of synergy, managers need to be closely involved during the negotiation 
process of the M&A, at the same time running the core business of the acquirer. Even after the M&A 
transaction is closed, managers have to focus on the identification and capture of value which demands 
time as well. (Simpson, 2000) Not only might management have to deal with other management views 
of the target company, but they also have to attempt to make or keep employees satisfied. Employees 
of the target company might feel invaded by the acquisition. Management has the responsibility to 
create a respectful working environment in which the employees will not feel invaded anymore and 
are committed to the company. 
1.5.3. Target Valuation Challenges  
Evaluating the right acquiring price for the target firm is also a challenge of M&A. Commonly, 
the price paid for an acquisition is higher than the intrinsic value of the target. Challenges for target 
valuation comprises the choice of the valuation method, information asymmetry between the buyer 
and seller, and the valuation of assets. It is believed that there is no perfect method for deciding the 
price, making acquiring firms difficult during the process.  
1.5.4. Synergy Realization Challenges 
Anticipated synergies are often not realized (Recardo & Toterhi, 2015). Therefore, it is 
important to have the challenges in mind regarding realizing the expected synergies. In order to 
generate synergies, the estimation of synergies has to be made. If the estimation is incorrect, it would 
be more difficult to achieve the expected synergies. However, synergy from revenue enhancement is 
hard to predict, making the process a challenge of M&A. Besides, cultural differences can affect the 
extent to which synergies can be realized, as argued by Larsson and Finkelstein (1999). This indicates 
the link between integration challenges and challenges regarding the realization of anticipated 
synergies. Challenges discussed in the integration challenges are also of the essence in this section.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter, the relevant empirical papers in the selected fields of research will be discussed 
and categorized into five different results. Moreover, the literature review draws attention to the 
variables of prior studies. Accordingly, hypotheses of the current research are developed.  
Section 1. EFFECTS OF PRIOR ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE 
Prior studies on general M&A performance found that despite most of the firms do 
understand what needs to be done; however, many firms do not quite seem to know how to do it, as 
the majority of acquisitions continue to fail. To learn how to do it, an organization's acquisition 
experiences appear to be one of the primary mechanisms. Researches have widely supported the fact 
that people, organizations, and even industries have the ability to learn or transfer knowledge since the 
late 19th century (Ingram, 2002). The learning and gaining experience works are, therefore, certainly 
not a new phenomenon. Consequently, it is also believed that the firm's acquisition experience seems 
to be how firms may learn how to achieve favorable acquisition in the future (Hayward, 2002). Since 
the 1980s, various studies have been made in understanding the relationship between a) acquisition 
experiences and b) performance of focal acquisition. However, among those empirical studies, 
multiple kinds of results are found to be conflicting and can be categorized into the following five 
types.  
2.1.1. Positive Effect 
With the evidence of 42 industrial manufacturing firms that engaged in the tender offer form 
of acquisition from 1975 to 1979, Flower and Schmidt (1989) stated that the significant positive 
relationship was observed, indicating that on the average, post-acquisition financial performance 
improved significantly for organizations that had previous acquisition experience, acquired a higher 
percentage of a target, or was older. The factors of interest in this study included relative size, previous 
acquisition experience, and industry similarity. The financial performance included both accounting 
and capital market data within the relatively long period, which is 4 years, and was measured by short-
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term cumulative abnormal return.  
In the same vein, Bruton et al. (1994) in his research noted that there is a positive relationship 
between M&A experiences and acquisition performances. In the study, a perpetual performance 
measure was used to measure the acquisition performances for 51 financially distressed acquisitions 
between 1979 to 1987.  
More recently, Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) examined acquisitions from 1998 to 2014 and 
provided evidence that acquirers with experienced boards are likely to make better acquisitions. 
Secondly, the results suggested that experienced directors assist the firm in target selection, as 
acquirers with higher board acquisition experience earn higher combined value-weighted 
announcement returns. Finally, the author found that experienced boards may assist in target 
integration, as acquirers with more experienced boards undergo greater improvements in operating 
performance and total factor productivity. In the study, short-term cumulative abnormal return was 
used to determine the performances. 
2.1.2. Negative Effect 
Kusewitt (1985) examined acquisitions by 138 US firms in 1976, measured the acquisition 
performance with acquirers’ ROA, and found out that industry commonality and acquirer profitability 
were found to be positively related to performance. However, the remaining factors (relative size, 
acquisition rate, timing relative to the market cycle, and percentage cash acquisitions) were found to 
be negatively related to performance. The author also suggested the finding is contradictory to 
previous findings and could not explain such discrepancy. One plausible interpretation may be that the 
variable used in the study captured acquisition speed rather than acquisition experience. (Barkema & 
Schijven, 2008) 
More recently, Delong and Deyoung (2007) stated that large commercial banks did not learn 
by the number of acquisitions but by observing other banks’ acquisition-related successes and failures. 
Likewise, Laamanen and Keil (2008) studied the most active U.S. acquirers in the 1990s and found 




2.1.3. No Significant Effect 
A quantitative study by Hayward (2002) examined the performance of 214 acquisitions 
completed by 120 firms in 6 industries from 1990 to 1995 and came into the result that the experience 
alone may be insufficient to ensure superior acquisition performance ultimately.  
A firm's focal acquisition performance positively relates to prior acquisitions that are a) not 
highly similar or dissimilar to the focal acquisition, b) associated with small losses and c) not too 
temporally close to or distant from the focal acquisition. In this study, post-acquisition performances 
were measured by short-term cumulative abnormal return. 
Using a sample of 228 acquisitions in the U.S. banking industry, Zollo and Singh (2004) found 
that knowledge codification strongly and positively influences acquisition performance, while the 
impact of experience accumulation is not significant. Moreover, increasing levels of post-acquisition 
integration strengthen the positive effect of codification. Finally, the level of integration between the 
two merged firms significantly enhance performance, while replacing top managers in the acquired 
firm negatively impact performance, all else being equal. In the study, company performances were 
measured by the acquirer’s ROA. 
2.1.4. U-shaped relationship 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) examined the influence of prior organizational acquisition 
experiences on the performance of acquisitions with data from 449 acquisitions from 1980 to 1992 
and showed an overall U-shaped relationship between organization acquisition experience and 
acquisition performance. Besides, the more similar a firm's acquisition targets are to its prior targets, 
the better they perform. They suggested that relatively inexperienced acquirers, after making their first 
acquisition, inappropriately generalize acquisition experience to subsequent dissimilar acquisitions, 
while more experienced acquirers appropriately discriminate between their acquisitions.  
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) stated that in the sequence of a firm's acquisition, what the 
first acquisition performs can be considered as a baseline level. After the first acquisition, while firms 
are still novices, inappropriate generalization will be the most common behavior, and subsequent 
acquisitions may perform less well than the first acquisition because a bigger scale of firms can 
 
 15 
generate more difficulties while integrating.  
However, as firms gain acquisition experience and develop expertise in understanding the 
dissimilarities between all the acquisitions, the tendency to generalize inappropriately should diminish, 
while the tendency to generalize appropriately should increase, leading to greater success. Therefore, 
any initial negative relationship between acquisition experience and performance may correct itself 
with subsequent acquisition experience, resulting in an overall U-shaped curve.  
2.1.5. Inverted U-shaped relationship 
Meschi and Metais (2006) analyzed the valuation effect of the acquirer's experience for 291 
French acquisitions from 1988 to 2004 in the United States. The results were mixed concerning the 
relationship among acquisition performance, acquisition experience, and heterogeneous experience. 
The authors put into light that the relationship between acquisition performance and acquisition 
experience follows a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) distribution at the date of the acquisition 
announcement. In this study, post-acquisition performances were measured by short-term cumulative 
abnormal return. The study stated that there is an optimal point for the influence of experiences on the 
performance. Before reaching the optimal point, experiences would be positively related to the 
performance of the focal deal. However, after a certain period, the performances would become lower 
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Section 2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior research showed conflicting results among the relationship between a) acquisition 
experiences and b) the performance of focal acquisition. Meanwhile, less research tried to analyze the 
situation of Taiwanese firms. Moreover, fewer researches have been done in emerging markets. Thus, 
further research focus on Taiwanese firms is essential to be tested. Based on the result of the literature 
reviews, the following hypotheses are developed.  
2.2.1. Experiences of Merge and Acquisition 
In the previous studies, it can be observed that a vital majority have been developed from the 
Behavioral Learning Theory. Behavioral Learning Theory believes that once organizational routines 
are conducted through the accumulation of prior experiences, they can become competitive advantages 
and play a critical pint in a firm’s strategic decisions, including M&A actions. (Gulati, 1995) Firms 
would, therefore, gain more capability not only of managing the acquisition but also of choosing 
suitable targets of following M&A decisions if they have related experiences.  
While some researches failed to find the positive result in the relationship between acquisition 
performance and prior experiences. (Kusewitt, 1985; Zollo and Singh, 2004) Saying that 
organizational performance is significantly negatively related to the prior acquisitions of the acquirer, 
Kusewitt reported that the performance of M&A is more related to the possibility of cooperation 
indigestion and inefficient consolidation than the ability of learning. The above conflicts about the 
“learning-by-doing” theory can be formally stated as the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1a: Acquisition performance is positively related to the prior acquisitions of the acquirer. 
Hypothesis 1b: Acquisition performance is negatively related to the prior acquisitions of the acquirer. 
On the other hand, Heleblian and Finkelstein (1999) stated that in the sequence of a firm's 
acquisition, what the first acquisition performs can be considered as a baseline level. After the first 
acquisition, while firms are still novices, inappropriate generalization will be the most common 
behavior, and subsequent acquisitions may perform less well than the first acquisition because a bigger 
scale of firms can generate more difficulties while integrating.  
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However, as firms gain acquisition experience and develop expertise in understanding the 
dissimilarities between all the acquisitions, the tendency to generalize inappropriately should diminish, 
while the tendency to generalize appropriately should increase, leading to greater success. Therefore, 
any initial negative relationship between acquisition experience and performance may correct itself 
with subsequent acquisition experience, resulting in an overall U-shaped curve. Based on the theory, 
I develop the following hypothesis to better clarify the relationship between acquisition performance 
and prior acquisitions.  
Hypothesis 1c: Acquisition performance is related to the prior acquisitions of the acquirer in a U-
shaped way.  
2.2.2. The Business of Prior Acquisitions 
This sector discusses whether the business of prior M&A experiences affects the performance 
of focal acquisition. When events are similar, the transfer tends to be positive, and behavior is assumed 
to be appropriately applied to a similar situation (Mazur 1998). When events are dissimilar, the transfer 
may be negative, and behavior is assumed to be misapplied to a dissimilar situation (Novick 1988). If 
targets of prior acquisition are similar to the focal acquisition, acquirers have more possibilities of 
generating inferences after the focal acquisition, allowing the firms to have a better performance. In 
contrast, when targets of prior acquisitions are dissimilar with the focal acquisition, acquirers have 
fewer possibilities of generating inferences after the focal acquisition, resulting in a worse 
performance. Based on the concept, I develop the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2a: The performance of the acquisition is positively affected by the similarity of the 
business of prior acquisitions. 
Even though prior researches show that higher similarity between business can generate a 
bigger chance of having better performance. In contrast, higher dissimilarity makes acquirers unable 
to extract gains from prior experiences. Once the inferences developed, the routine and advantages 
may be outdated and diminish over time. (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 2002) Following the concept, I 
develop the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2b: The performance of the acquisition is affected by the similarity of the business of prior 
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acquisitions in an inverted U-shaped way.  
2.2.3. The Temporal Intervals Between Acquisitions 
This sector aims to understand whether the time intervals between acquisitions influence the 
performance of focal acquisition. Even if the firm did generate learning advantages from the prior 
M&A experiences, it is also believed that the advantages may not be applied to the later acquisitions 
if the time difference between two M&A actions is too long. Long intervals between a focal acquisition 
and the one before it magnify the inaccessibility of learning. Shorter intervals between a focal 
acquisition and the one before it prevents such inaccessibility to happen. (Ginsberg A, 1998) Some, 
nevertheless, argued that there is no such relationship between the acquisition performance and 
temporal interval because firms may not be able to generate critical inferences from the very recent 
experiences. To understand the evidence from Taiwanese firms, the following hypotheses are 
developed. 
Hypothesis 3a: Acquisition performance is negatively related to the time elapsed between the focal 
acquisition and the ones before it.  
Hypothesis 3b: Acquisition performance is not significantly related to the time elapsed between the 
focal acquisition and the ones before it.  
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CHAPTER 3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Section 1. RESEARCH SETTING & DATA DESCRIPTION 
The current research aims to improve our understanding of the relationship between acquisition 
experience and acquisition performance by exploring the explanatory role of M&A experiences, the 
businesses of prior acquisitions, and the temporal intervals between acquisitions. In this research, data 
are obtained from S&P CAPITAL IQ PLATFORM by applying the following criteria.  
1) Transaction Type: Merger or Acquisition 
2) Acquirers’ country of incorporation is Taiwan 
3) Acquirers are either public listed in either Taiwan Stock exchange (TSEC) or Gre Tai 
Securities Market (GTSM) 
4) Announcement date of M&A Transactions are from 2015/01/01 to 2019/12/31 
5) The status of the transaction is “closed” by 2019/12/31 
After the above screening, deals without sufficient data are eliminated from the sample. 
Besides, for the cases that a single acquirer made several acquisitions in the period under study, all 
acquisitions are treated as one sample, and a total of 91 deals is collected. This setting is deemed to be 
particularly well suited for the current research purposes for several reasons that will be presented next.  
First, the sample has no restrictions on industry and all types of merge and acquisition, such as 
cross-border M&A, medium, and small size deals, are included. It is expected to add valuable insights 
to the M&A related literature. In the previous studies, most of the authors limited the data to specific 
industries or only large acquisitions. However, such a narrow sample is considered a limitation of the 
extant literature. Therefore, the recent reviews of M&A literature have consistently accentuated the 
need for more comprehensive samples to ensure a higher degree of external validity of the results and 
to maintain consistency with the organizational learning theory argument. (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 
1999; Hayward, 2002; Zollo and Singh, 2004) 
Second, making the acquirers’ country of incorporation constant alleviates home country 
effects. By having only Taiwanese acquirers in the sample, the collection of information about 
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acquiring firms involved a single database, providing more reliable data for the current research. (Cook 
and Campbell, 1979) Last but not least, the data period chosen from 2015 to 2019 is considered 
relatively relevant. As mentioned, Taiwan’s historical trend of M&A reached peaked in 2015, and it is 
believed that the year has a strong influence on the result. Besides, a too-long period may result in 
misleading results. Therefore, the current research follows Flower and Schmidt (1989) and collect the 
sample within five years.  
Table 2. Sample Deals Breakdown by Industry 
Industry Number of 
Deals 
Information Technology 56 
Manufacturing 13 
Materials 6 
Health Care 4 




Real Estate 1 
No Primary Industry Assigned 1 
 
As shown in Table 2, most of the M&A deals occur in the Information Technology industry, 
especially in the “Semiconductor” sector. The previous analysis stated that the major semiconductor 
players are looking for companies that have lower operating expenses as compared to their growth 
potential. These major players target medium or small-sized companies that lack the scale to grow. 
M&A plays a very important role in the pursuit of growth for semiconductor companies. Moreover, 
the semiconductor, as the base of modern electronic and IT industries, is vital for both industrial society 
and national power. The trend of the global net sales of the semiconductor industry will still increase in 
the future due to the rapidly increased demand for technology. Recently, Taiwan has started to improve 
its presence in this area through merger and acquisition. (Shao, Asatani, & Sakata, 2019) 
One notable example is the acquisition between United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) 
and Mie Fujitsu Semiconductor Limited (MIFS) in 2019. UMC is a leading global semiconductor 
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foundry based in Taiwan. The company provides mature and advanced IC production with a focus on 
Specialty Technologies to manufacture ICs for applications spanning every major sector of the 
electronics industry. Starting from 2014, UMC acquired a 15.9% stake from MIFS through progressive 
phases. Until October 1, 2019, UMC purchased the remaining 84.1% of MIFS and completed the 
acquisition. As a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Taiwan-based UMC, MIFS was renamed as United 
Semiconductor Japan Co., Ltd. (USJC). This acquisition strengthens UMC’s business foundation as a 
leading global semiconductor foundry with a broad customer portfolio, enhanced manufacturing 
expertise, and extensive technology offerings, enabling MIFS to maximize its potential, enhance 
Japan’s semiconductor industry competitiveness and drive values to UMC’s stakeholders. 
Jason Wang, co-president of UMC, said, “This win-win acquisition will create synergies 
through the integration of USJC’s world-class production quality standards and employees with 
UMC's decades of manufacturing experience, the economy of scale and foundry expertise to provide 
enhanced support for new and existing Japanese customers. Meanwhile, UMC’s global customers will 
gain access to a volume production 300mm fab in Japan. Going forward, we will continue to stay 
focused on our strength in Specialty Technologies and explore growth opportunities in line with this 
strategy through the evaluation of both internal and external capacity expansion opportunities.” 
Section 2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In most of the previous studies, “Multiple regression” has been widely used as methodology. 
Accordingly, the current research follows multiple regression to develop the following calculation 
models based on different hypotheses.  
3.2.1. Model for Testing Hypothesis 1 
To test hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 1b, the current research replicates the results of previous 
studies on acquisition experience that failed to understand the situation of Taiwanese firms. The current 
model is developed from the model of Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) and that adapted by Jang and 
Daniliuc (2014), which are considered as benchmark models. The model is presented as follow: 
PERFi,t = α0 + β1ORGEXPi,t + β2RELATEDi,t + β3FOREIGNi,t + β4RELSIZEi,t  
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+ β5SIZEi,t + β6DEBTi,t + β7FCFi,t + β8PREPERFi,t + εi,t               (Model 1-1) 
To test hypothesis 1c, the curvilinear relationship between a) acquisition experiences and b) 
the performance of focal acquisition. The current research follows Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) 
and the square term of acquisition experience is added. The model is presented as follow: 
PERFi,t = α0 + β1ORGEXPi,t + β2(ORGEXPi,t)2 + β3RELATEDi,t  
+ β4FOREIGNi,t + β5RELSIZEi,t + β6SIZEi,t + β7DEBTi,t  
+ β8FCFi,t + β9PREPERFi,t + εi,t                                    (Model 1-2) 
In the above two models, PERF is the acquisition performance; ORGEXP is the total number 
of organizational acquisition experience; RELATED is the acquirer to target business similarity; 
FOREIGN is a dummy variable where 1 is the acquisition of a non-Taiwanese target and 0 otherwise; 
RELSIZE is the relative acquisition payment to the total asset of the acquiring firm; SIZE is the total 
asset of the acquirer as of the end of the fiscal year before the focal deal; DEBT is the debt to equity 
ratio of the acquirer; FCF is the free cash flow to equity ratio of the acquirer; PREPERF is the 
acquirer’s ROA as of the end of the fiscal year before the focal deal; and εi,t is the regression error 
term. These variables are explained in the following sections. 
3.2.2. Model for Testing Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that the performance of focal acquisition is positively affected by the 
similarity of prior acquisitions. To test hypothesis 2a, the similarity of prior acquisitions is added in 
model 1. The current model is presented as follow: 
PERFi,t = α0 + β1SIMi,t + β2ORGEXPi,t + β3RELATEDi,t + β4FOREIGNi,t + β5RELSIZEi,t 
+ β6SIZEi,t + β7DEBTi,t + β8FCFi,t + β9PREPERFi,t + εi,t               (Model 2-1) 
On the other hand, hypothesis 2b predicts that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between a) acquisition experiences and b) the similarity of prior acquisitions. To test hypothesis 2b, 
the square term of the similarity of prior acquisitions is added in the current model. The model is 
presented as follow:  
PERFi,t = α0 + β1SIMi,t + β1(SIMi,t) 2 + β2 ORGEXPi,t +  β3(ORGEXPi,t)2  
+ β4RELATEDi,t+ β5FOREIGNi,t + β6RELSIZEi,t + β7SIZEi,t  
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+ β8DEBTi,t + β9FCFi,t + β10PREPERFi,t + εi,t.                       (Model 2-2)           
In the above two models, SIM is the similarity of prior experiences. The variable is explained 
in the following sections. 
3.2.3. Model for Testing Hypothesis 3 
To test hypothesis 3a and hypothesis 3b, the current research replicates the results of previous 
studies on acquisition experience that failed to understand the time elapsed factors of Taiwanese firms. 
Based on the studies of Hayward (2002), the current model is developed and presented as follow: 
PERFi,t = α0 + β1TIMEi,t+ β2ORGEXPi,t + β3RELATEDi,t + β4FOREIGNi,t  
+ β5RELSIZEi,t + β6SIZEi,t + β7DEBTi,t + β8FCFi,t + β9PREPERFi,t + εi,t   (Model 3) 
In the above model, TIME is the timing of focal acquisitions. The variable is explained in the 
following sections. 
Section 3. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Up to now, there are conflicts in choosing indicators for the performance of focal acquisitions 
in the previous related studies. However, the more recent works on M&A performance show strong 
support for short-term cumulative stock returns as a measurement base for acquisition performance 
(e.g. Toft, 2010). Therefore, in the current research, acquisition performance would be measured by 
using short-term average abnormal returns (AARs). This measure has been widely used in the M&A 
literature that examined the effect of the acquirer’s experience on acquisition performance. (e.g. 
Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1991; Hayward, 2002)  
In calculating AARs, “Event Study Methodology” has been applied. Event Study Methodology 
observes and analyzes a series of developments about a chosen event with a focus on a predetermined 
time window before, at the time of the event it, self, and the time window following the event. This 
approach was developed as a statistical tool for empirical research and made its way into multiple 
domains such as economics, history, finance, management, and law to name a few. (Corrado, 2011)  
Based on the Event Study Methodology, abnormal returns (ARs) can be determined by 
comparing observed returns with expected returns around the announcement day. If observed returns 
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are significantly different than expected returns, there will be abnormal returns. Positive abnormal 
returns are synonym of good financial performance as it increases the value of shareholders and vice 
versa (Wang & Moini, 2012). In M&A cases, the abnormal returns represent the price difference 
between the predicted prices and the observed prices of a security. The impact of an event is measured 
by subtracting predicted return from the actual return, which can be expressed as the following 
mathematical equation:  
ARit = (Rit – αit + βitRmt) 
In this equation, ARit is the return on stock i for day t; Rmt is the return on market portfolio for 
day t; αit is the constant of stock i on the market portfolio, and βit means the beta of stock i. It is assumed 
that α and β are stable and are calculated during an arbitrary estimation period. To determine the 
arbitrary estimation period, I follow Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) and use 240 days starting from 
300 days prior to the announcement of the acquisition to 61 days announcement of the acquisition. 
(day t -240 to day t -61, where t is the announcement date) Besides, only trading days are applied to 
the calculation. After the above process, the cumulative abnormal returns, which is called as CARs, 
can be calculated by the following mathematical equation:  
CAR(a,b) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅!"#$ it 
In the above equation, ARit is the return on stock i for day t; a is the first day of event window; 
b is the last day, and n represents the number of days in the event window. The AARs, the average 
abnormal returns, are then calculated by averaging CARs over the number of days in the event window. 
In M&A deals, research findings indicate information about an acquisition tends to become known to 
some market participants before the official announcement date (Asquith 1983). Moreover, small 
windows around an acquisition may miss early market reactions to an acquisition announcement, 
while large windows may capture information unrelated to the acquisition. Therefore, a paired sample 
analysis will be conducted from the event window of (-1,+1), (-3,+3), (-5,+5), and (-10,+10). Among 
all the windows, the (-5, +5) window has been believed to have the highest predictive validity of an 
export measure of acquisition performance (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004). 
In acknowledgment of other popular windows used in strategic performance measurement, namely 
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event windows of (-1,+1), (-3,+3), (-10,+10). I also report the results in those intervals as a sensitivity 
test. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged here that short-term cumulative stock returns measures 
market reaction towards an “announcement of acquisition” instead of actual acquisition performance. 
Section 4. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Previous studies that have examined the relationship between acquisition performance and 
acquisition experience have consistently conceptualized the acquiring organizational acquisition 
experience as the sum of recent acquisitions undertaken by the firm. (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; 
Hayward, 2002) Consistent with the previous literatures, the current research defines organizational 
acquisition experience (ORGEXP) as the number of acquisitions completed by the firm before the 
focal acquisitions. Besides, in the case that an acquirer made several acquisitions in the period under 
study, all deals are treated as one sample.  
Another independent variable, SIM, represents that the similarity of prior acquisitions. To 
measure similarity, the current research follows Morck et al. (1990) and uses 2-digit SIC codes. SIC 
codes, which stands for “Standard Industry Classification” have been widely used in previous studies 
to determine the similarity of business for two different firms. Thus, if all prior acquisitions share the 
same 2-digit SIC code, the score is 1. If no two acquisitions share the same SIC code, the score is 0. 
If two out of the firms’ four prior acquisitions share are within the same code, the score is 0.5, and so 
on.  
Last but not least, the timing of focal acquisition (TIME) indicates the number of years 
difference between the average of prior acquisition and the focal acquisition. If the firm has only one 
acquisition experience, I input the maximum interval.  
Section 5. CONTROL VARIABLES 
In this section, control variables are categorized into two different types and discussed. 
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3.5.1. Variables Related to Deal Characteristics   
Firstly, RELATED represents the acquirer to target relatedness. According to Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999), firms can generate better synergy results when the main businesses of the acquirer 
and the target are the same or similar. Following the way in previous studies, RELATED is measured 
by 2-digit SIC codes. RELATED is 1 if the acquirer and the target have the same 2-digit SIC codes, 
otherwise is 0.  
Secondly, since cross-border acquisitions may generate lower returns than domestic 
acquisitions because the acquirer is less familiar with foreign targets. (Yung, 2001; Jang and Daniliuc 
2014) Consistent with Hayward (2002), the current research adds the dummy variable, which is 
FOREIGN, to control for cross-border acquisitions. FOREIGN is 1 if the target is Taiwanese firms, 
otherwise is 0.  
Thirdly, believing that relatively larger acquisitions are more likely to affect the abnormal 
returns (AAR) of acquirers simply by virtue of their size, it is essential to control this variable. (Asquith, 
P., 1983) Therefore, RELSIZE is added in this research, representing the final value of acquisition as 
a percentage of the total equity of the acquirer as of the end of the fiscal year before the deal. 
3.5.2. Variables Related to Acquirer Characteristics   
First of all, previous studies suggest that the pre-acquisition quality of the acquiring firm’s 
resource endowment may influence its strategic choices and in turn affect acquisition performance 
(Zollo and Singh, 2004). The SIZE represents the pre-acquisition quality of the acquiring firm’s 
resources should be taken into concern in the current research. Therefore, I measure acquirer size 
(SIZE) as the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets (in million USD) as the end of the fiscal 
year before the deal.  
Besides, some analysts emphasized the importance of slack in M&A decisions while the 
direction of the influences is unclear. There are different opinions toward what would be the indicators 
of slack. Hitt et al. (1993) argued that greater slack reduces the costs of debt and provides better 
financial security. Consistent with their expectations, they found that acquirer slack, in the form of a 
large amount of available cash or a favorable debt position is associated with high performing 
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acquisitions. In contrast, Jensen (1986) stated that firms with large amounts of free cash flow (a 
concept similar to slack) would be more likely to undertake low-benefit or sometimes value-destroying 
mergers. To the extent this is true, slack will be negatively related to acquisition performance. 
Combining the above arguments and developed from the research of Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), 
the current research measures slack in two ways. First, slack is measured by the average debt-to-equity 
ratio (DEBT), a conventional measure inversely related to slack. Second, I measured the percentage 
of free cash flow (FCF) as (Operating Income - Taxes - Interest Expense - Preferred Dividend - 
Common Dividend) / Equity. Both variables were measured as of the end of the fiscal year before the 
deal.  
The last control variable is PREPERF. According to the study of Morck et al. (1990), it is 
showed that acquiring a firm’s pre-acquisition performance is positively related to post-acquisition 
performance, hinting that firms with better financial performance are better acquirers. Hence, I 
measure the pre-acquisition performance (PREPERF) as the ROA of acquirers at the end of the fiscal 
















Table 3. Measurement of Each Variable 
Types Variables Meaning Measurement 
Dependent Variable PERF Focal acquisition 
performance 
Short-term cumulative 
abnormal return with four 
windows: (-1,1), (-3,+3), 
(-5,+5), and (-10,10) 
Independent Variables ORGEXP Prior acquisition 
experience 
The number of acquisitions 
completed by the firm before 
the focal acquisitions 
SIM Similarity of prior 
acquisition  
A simple percentage score 
that calculated by the 
common 2 digits SIC code of 
prior acquisitions 
TIME Timing of 
acquisition 
The number of years 
difference between the 
average of prior acquisition 
and the focal acquisition 
Control Variables RELATED Acquirer to target 
business similarity  
1 if the acquirer and target 
share the same 2 digits SIC 
code and 0 if not 
FOREIGN Domestics or Cross-
border acquisition 
1 if the acquirer and target 
are both Taiwanese firms and 
0 if not 
RELSIZE Relative acquisition 
size 
The final acquisition price as 
a percentage of acquirer’s 
total equity as the end of 
fiscal year before the deal 
SIZE Size of acquirer Acquirer’s total asset as the 
end of fiscal year before the 
deal 
DEBT Debt-to-equity ratio Acquirer’s debt/equity ratio 
as the end of fiscal year 
before the deal 
FCF Free cash flow to 
equity ratio 
Acquirer’s FCF/equity ratio 
as the end of fiscal year 
before the deal 
PREPERF Pre-acquisition 
performance 
Acquirer’s ROA as the end 




CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Section 1. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND CORRELATIONS FOR VARIABLES 
This section shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the primary tests of the 
current research. For the sample containing 91 merges and acquisitions, the mean value of acquisition 
performance (PERF) measured as cumulative abnormal stock returns over the (-1,+1) event window 
is 0.58%, over the (-3,+3) event window is 0.2%, over the (-5,+5) event window is 0.2%, and over the 
(-10,+10) event window is 0.13%, statistically equivalent to 0. This result is in compliance with other 
findings (e.g., Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000) that average abnormal returns to the acquiring firm are 
statistically equivalent to zero. This suggests that, on average, acquisitions do not result in significant 
performance improvements after the announcement of M&A transactions. This result reinforces the 
need for a better understanding of potential factors that influence on acquisition performance. 
Table 4. Descriptive Data for Variables (N=91)  
Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
AAR(-1,+1) -4.11% 3.91% 0.58% 0.30% 0.014 
AAR(-3,+3) -1.60% 5.07% 0.20% 0.03% 0.009 
AAR(-5,5) -1.60% 4.20% 0.20% 0.15% 0.008 
AAR(-10,10) -1.37% 2.49% 0.13% 0.03% 0.005 
ORGEXP 0.00 75.00 8.82 3.00 16.20 
SIM 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.71 0.40 
TIME 0.00 12.00 4.40 4.00 3.41 
RELATED 0.00 1.00 0.64 1.00 0.48 
FOREIGN 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.00 0.50 
RELSIZE 0.00 728% 25% 5.28% 0.80 
SIZE 23.10 181576 9800.99 754.97 27407.10 
DEBT 0.00 1.81 0.52 0.45 0.52 
FCF -5.46 0.81 0.04 0.12 0.62 
PREPERF -24.65 20.71 3.84 3.46 6.89 
 
The mean of the organizational acquisition experience (ORGEXP) is 8.82, indicating that, on 
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average, the sample acquirers have been involved in 8.82 acquisitions prior to the sample acquisition. 
This is slightly more than the mean results of organizational experience exhibited in the study of 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999). The cause of the difference is likely to be the longer time interval 
that the current research has used to capture the organizational experience. However, since the median 
of organizational acquisition experience is 3.00, suggesting the result of 8.82 may have resulted from 
the fact that there are only a few companies contribute to the higher number in the mean of the 
organizational acquisition experience. 
The mean of similarity of prior experiences (SIM), which is 0.61, shows that Taiwanese firms 
tend to acquirer firms that run similar businesses since before. Besides, the mean of similarity between 
the acquirer and target business (RELATED) is 0.64 and the medium of RELATED is 1, indicating 
that, on average, more than a half of the sample Taiwanese acquirers chose the targets that have similar 
business to their original business; The mean of the number of years difference between the average 
of prior acquisition and the focal acquisition (TIME) is 4.4 and the maximum of TIME is 12, meaning 
that the time intervals of acquisition done by Taiwanese firms is longer. The finding is in line with the 
facts mentioned before; The mean of FOREIGN is 0.49, meaning that Taiwanese firms may not have 
a preference in choosing domestic or cross-border targets in recent five years since the domestic and 
cross-border M&As account almost fifty to fifty among all sample acquisitions.  
From the above table, it is also observed that the standard deviation of the acquirer’s total assets 
(SIZE) is 27407, which higher than most of the prior research. The cause of the difference is believed 
to be a big difference in size between Taiwanese companies. Few of the companies are big to compete 
internationally, while some of them are not, which in compliance with the mentioned fact. Other 
control variables on deal characteristics (RELATED, FOREIGN) and acquirer characteristics (DEBT, 
FCF, PREPERF) are in line with Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) and Hayward (2002).  
The following correlation matrix of the variables included in all tests is reported in Table 5. 
Although it appears that some positive correlation exists between the explanatory variables, most of 
the bivariate correlation are below 0.5 in absolute values, except for the correlations between 
ORGEXP and SIZE, suggesting a low level of collinearity, which shows the same result as Jang, J., & 
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Daniliuc, S. (2014). The results are believed to be unlikely to bias the regression coefficients. 
Table 5. Correlations for Variables (N=91) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.ORGEXP 1          
2.SIM 0.127 1         
3.TIME 0.439 0.446 1        
4.RELATED 0.037 0.039 0.0274 1       
5.FOREIGN 0.145 0.080 0.1311 0.106 1      
6.RELSIZE 0.133 0.108 0.2008 0.078 0.048 1     
7.SIZE 0.636 0.112 0.2502 0.017 0.107 0.082 1    
8.DEBT 0.127 0.144 0.0572 0.125 0.276 0.018 0.108 1   
9.FCF  0.068 0.096 0.1623 0.149 0.137 0.900 0.028 0.020 1  
10.PREPERF 0.054 0.098 0.0983 0.057 0.248 0.136 0.001 0.339 0.008 1 
 
Section 2. RESULT OF HYPOTHESIS 1 AND DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis 1a/1b predicts that organizational acquisition experience is positively/negatively 
related to the performance of acquisitions. The regression results are presented in Table 6  
Table 6. Results of Model 1-1 (N=91) 
  AAR(-1,+1) AAR(-3,+3) AAR(-5,+5) AAR(-10,+10) 
Intercept 0.4411 -0.1811 0.0629 -0.0873 
ORGEXP -0.0025 0.0014 -0.002 4.9895E-05 
RELATED 0.9440*** 0.6151*** 0.3812** 0.1468 
FOREIGN 0.2251 0.0645 -0.1808 0.0453 
RELSIZE 0.1771 0.4035 0.3969 0.3752** 
SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DEBT -0.6785* -0.2579 -0.1051 0.0063 
FCF  -0.4690 0.2224 0.2878 0.4311* 
PREPERF  -0.0630** 0.0033 -0.0028 0.0022 
Adjusted R^2 0.2106 0.1274 0.0937 0.261 
*P-value < 10%; ** P-value < 5%; ***P-value < 1% 
 
As shown, the coefficients of ORGEXP have both positive and negative results under different 
AAR windows. Coefficients of ORGEXP are -0.0025 and -0.002 under the windows of (-1,+1) and (-
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5,+5) respectively while 0.0014 and close to 0 under the windows of (-3,+3) and (-10,+10) respectively. 
Moreover, none of them have a P-value that is less than 10%. Therefore, the regression analysis of 
model 1 does not support that acquisition performance is positively or negatively related to the prior 
acquisitions of the acquirer (ORGEXP) at any confidence level. Hypothesis 1a and 1b both are not 
supported by the result of the regression analysis. Nevertheless, the RELATED show three significant 
results across the three windows of (-1,+1), (-3,+3), and (-5,+5), suggesting that RELATED affected 
acquisition performance positively in windows of (-1,+1), (-3,+3), and (-5,+5). 
Hypothesis 1c predicts that Acquisition performance is related to the prior acquisitions of the 
acquirer in a U-shaped way. The regression results are presented in Table 7.  
Table 7. Results of Model 1-2 (N=91)  
AAR (-1, +1) AAR(-3,+3) AAR(-5,+5) AAR(-10,+10) 
Intercept 0.4983 -0.1706 0.1066 -0.0497 
ORGEXP -0.0215 -0.0021 -0.0165 -0.0123 
ORGEXP^2 0.0003 0.000 0.0002 0.0002 
RELATED 0.9323*** 0.6129*** 0.3722** 0.1390 
FOREIGN 0.2738 0.0734 -0.1437 0.0772 
RELSIZE 0.1159 0.3922 0.3502 0.3350* 
SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DEBT -0.6493* -0.2525 -0.0829 0.0254 
FCF  -0.5355 0.2101 0.2370 0.3875* 
PREPERF  -0.0627** 0.0034 -0.0026 0.0023 
Adjusted R^2 0.2058 0.1170 0.0927 0.0302 
*P-value < 10%; ** P-value < 5%; ***P-value < 1% 
 
As shown, the coefficients of ORGEXP^2 have positive results under different AAR windows. 
However, none of them has P-value that is less than 10%. Therefore, the regression analysis of model 
1 does not support that acquisition performance is related to the prior acquisitions in a U-shaped way 
at any confidence level. On the other hand, the RELATED variables are significantly positive 
coefficient across the three windows of (-1,+1), (-3,+3), and (-5,+5), suggesting that the RELATED 
variable affected positively on the acquisition performances.  
The above results indicate that, after controlling for deal characteristics and acquirer 
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characteristics, the number of organizational acquisition experience does not significantly influence 
the performance of acquisitions. The result is in line with the previous studies conducted by Zollo and 
Singh (2004) and Jang, J., & Daniliuc, S. (2014). These authors found no significant evidence of the 
relationship between organizational acquisition experience and the performance of acquisitions. It is 
believed that the reason is that the number of prior experiences of the firm, on itself, may be deficient 
to ultimately create a high acquisition performance. Since the nature of prior acquisitions may be 
different from the focal one, making the acquirer unable to gain specialized knowledge. Consequently, 
there is a clear need to explore the explanatory role of similarity of the prior acquisitions. 
Section 3. RESULT OF HYPOTHESIS 2 AND DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that the performance of focal acquisition is positively affected by the 
similarity of prior acquisitions. The regression results are presented in Table 8.  
Table 8. Results of Model 2-1 (N=91) 
  AAR(-1,+1) AAR(-3,+3) AAR(-5,+5) AAR(-10,+10) 
Intercept 0.0707 -0.4254 -0.1877 -0.2250 
SIM 0.6134* 0.4045* 0.4150** 0.2280* 
ORGEXP -0.0032 0.0010 -0.0025 -0.0002 
RELATED 0.9507*** 0.6195*** 0.3857** 0.1493** 
FOREIGN 0.1469 0.0129 -0.2337 0.0162 
RELSIZE 0.1982 0.4175 0.4112* 0.3830 
SIZE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DEBT -0.5830 -0.1949 -0.0405 0.0418 
FCF  -0.4712 0.2210 0.2863 0.4303* 
PREPERF  -0.0654*** 0.0017 -0.0044 0.0013 
Adjusted R^2 0.2317 0.1484 0.1327 0.0463 
*P-value < 10%; ** P-value < 5%; ***P-value < 1% 
 
As shown, the coefficients of SIM have positive results under all AAR windows at 10%, 10%, 
5%, and 10% confidence level respectively. Hence, hypothesis 2a is supported by the regression 
analysis result of model 2-1, meaning that the similarity of prior acquisition affects the performance 
of the focal acquisition in a positive way. Moreover, similar to model 1-1 and model 1-2, acquirer-to-
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target relatedness (RELATED) shows positive coefficients to acquisition performance under all 
windows at significant levels, suggesting that RELATED variable affected positively on the 
acquisition performances. 
However, in table 8, the coefficients of ORGEXP have both positive and negative results under 
different AAR windows. Coefficients of ORGEXP are 0.001 under the window of (-3,+3) while -
0.0032, -0.0025, and -0.0002 under the windows of (-1,+1), (-5,+5) and (-10,+10) respectively.  
Moreover, none of them have P-value that is less than 10%. Therefore, it can be concluded that adding 
the similarity of the business of prior acquisitions does not improve the overall predictability of 
ORGEXP. As mentioned, the possible reason is that the number of acquisition experiences, by itself, 
may be deficient to ultimately create a high acquisition performance. 
Hypothesis 2b hopes to understand if the similarity of prior acquisition affects the performance 
of the focal acquisition in an inverted U-shaped way.  
 
Table 9. Results of Model 2-2 (N=91) 
 
As shown in Table 9, the result of the window (-10,10) shows that similarity (SIM) is 
significant with a positive coefficient and the square term is significant with a negative coefficient at 
  AAR(-1,+1) AAR(-3,+3) AAR(-5,+5) AAR(-10,+10) 
Intercept 0.1651 -0.4538 -0.2026 -0.291 
SIM -0.7508 1.6971 1.8699 2.941*** 
SIM^2 1.3676 -1.2122 -1.3409 -2.553*** 
ORGEXP -0.0136 -0.0247 -0.0414** -0.050*** 
ORGEXP^2 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005** 0.001*** 
RELATED 0.8642*** 0.6755*** 0.4414* 0.269** 
FOREIGN 0.2466 0.0036 -0.2203 -0.012 
RELSIZE 0.1243 0.3730 0.3290 0.302* 
SIZE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 
DEBT(Debt to Equity) -0.4764 -0.2226 -0.0511 -0.024 
FCF (FCF/Equity) -0.5274 0.1479 0.1686 0.290 
PREPERF (ROA) -0.0637*** 0.0004 -0.0058 -0.002 
Adjusted R^2 0.2278 0.1378 0.1469 0.1623 
*P-value < 10%; ** P-value < 5%; ***P-value < 1% 
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1% confidence level. Therefore, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between SIM and 
acquisition performance under the window (-10,+10). However, the other three windows show no 
evidence at any significant level of the coefficients. The analysis result is not sufficient to argue the 
inverted U-shaped relationship. Therefore, the relationship between the similarity of prior experiences 
and the performance of focal acquisitions tends to be more positive, as shown in Table 8. One possible 
explanation could be that Taiwanese firms are still going through the left part of the inverted U-shaped 
relationship. In that case, firms are in the process of evolving highly specialized routines and 
inferences from a narrow range of acquisitions, so acquisitions with the similar targets are more 
capable of extracting gains from prior experiences and result in better performances. Moreover, since 
the routine is not outdated yet, firms with similar targets will not lack the skills to appreciate the 
performances.  
Besides, the regression analysis of model 2-2 across all windows suggests that the coefficients 
of acquisition experience (ORGEXP) are all negative, and the square term is positive. Moreover, 
ORGEXP and ORGEXP^2 are at 5% and 1% significance level under (-5,+5) and (-10,+10) windows, 
respectively. The calculation results of windows (-5,+5) and (-10,10) support the hypothesis of the 
performance is affected by the organizational acquisition experiences in a U-shaped way. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that adding the similarity of prior acquisitions and the square term of it improves 
the overall predictability of ORGEXP to some extent, but not significantly. The reason that the U-
shaped results can be only found in the two longer windows of AAR might because of the 
conservativeness of Taiwanese investors, making them react slower to the announcement of M&A. 
Similar with the above results, the RELATED variables are significantly positively coefficient 
across the windows of (-1,+1), (-3,+3), (-5,+5), and (-10,+10) at 1%, 1%, 10%, and 5% respectively, 
suggesting that the RELATED variable affected positively on the acquisition performances.  
Section 4. RESULT OF HYPOTHESIS 3 AND DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis 3a/3b intends to understand that if there is any relationship between acquisition 
performances and the timing of focal acquisition (TIME), which indicates the number of years 
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difference between the average of prior acquisition and the focal acquisition prior acquisitions.  
Table 10. Results of Model 3 (N=91) 
  AAR(-1,+1) AAR(-3,+3) AAR(-5,+5) AAR(-10,+10) 
Intercept 0.4552 -0.1124 0.0099 -0.1609 
TIME -0.0048 -0.0232 0.0178 0.0248 
ORGEXP -0.0021 0.0037 -0.0039 -0.0024 
RELATED 0.9429*** 0.6100*** 0.3851** 0.1522 
FOREIGN 0.2324 0.1000 -0.2082 0.0073 
RELSIZE 0.1746 0.3916 0.4060* 0.3879** 
SIZE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DEBT(Debt to Equity) -0.6793* -0.2619 -0.1020 0.0106 
FCF (FCF/Equity) -0.4691 0.2220 0.2881 0.4316* 
PREPERF (ROA) -0.0627** 0.0045 -0.0037 0.0008 
Adjusted R^2 0.2009 0.1226 0.0878 0.0360 
*P-value < 10%; ** P-value < 5%; ***P-value < 1% 
 
As shown in Table 10, the coefficients of TIME have both positive and negative results under 
different AAR windows; two negative coefficients under the windows of (-1,+1) and (-3,+3) and two 
positive coefficients under the windows of (-5,+5) and (-10,+10). Moreover, none of them have P-
value that is less than 10%. Therefore, the regression analysis of model 3 does not support that 
acquisition performance is not positively or negatively related to the time intervals (TIME) at any 
confidence level. The results show that there is no significant relationship between TIME and 
acquisition performances. This finding is inconsistent with the positive relationship founded by 
Hayward (2002). One possible explanation is that the size of acquisitions in the data set includes both 
large sizes and small sizes. However, in Hayward’s study, only larger acquisitions were examined. 
Analyzing all size of acquisitions may be the reason that the current model shows no significant result 
of the influence of time interval. Besides, the coefficients of ORGEXP have both positive and negative 
results under different AAR windows. Moreover, none of them have P-value that is less than 10%. 




Same in the previous model, acquirer- to target relatedness (RELATED) shows the same 
positive coefficients at significant levels in windows of (-1,+1), (-3,+3), and (-5,+5), suggesting that 
the RELATED variable affected positively on the acquisition performances. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Section 1. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this thesis is to improve our understanding of the effects of acquisition 
experience by exploring the explanatory roles of organizational acquisition experiences, the similarity 
of the prior acquisition experiences, and the time interval. This thesis examines the effect of acquisition 
experiences on acquisition performance by testing three sets of related hypotheses. The evidence is 
obtained from multiple regression analysis with dependent being the short-term average abnormal 
returns (AARs) calculated from event study methodology, independent variables being acquisition 
experiences related factors, and control variables being seven variables commonly be taken into 
concern in previous studies. Sample data contained a total of 91 outbound merger and acquisition deals 
announced and closed by Taiwanese listed firms from January 1st, 2015 to December 31st, 2019. Four 
key findings are as follows.  
First of all, there is no significant relationship between the number of acquisition experiences 
and acquisition performance. The finding supports the argument made by Zollo and Singh (2004) and 
Jang, J., & Daniliuc, S. (2014) in the previous studies. These authors found no significant relationship 
between the two variables since the number of prior experiences of the firm, on itself, may be deficient 
to ultimately create a high acquisition performance. The nature of prior acquisitions may be different 
from the focal one, making the acquirer unable to gain specialized knowledge.  
Secondly, the acquisition performance is positively affected by the similarity of prior 
acquisition experiences. If the target companies in previous experiences have similar business with 
the target of the focal business, the performance of the focal acquisition transaction would become 
better. The finding is inconsistent with the inverted U-shaped result founded by Hayward (2002). One 
probable explanation could be that Taiwanese firms are still going through the left part of the inverted 
U-shaped relationship. In that case, firms are in the process of evolving highly specialized routines 
and inferences from a narrow range of acquisitions, so acquisition with similar targets are more capable 
of extracting gains from prior experiences and result in better performances. Moreover, since the 
 
 40 
routine is not outdated yet, firms with similar targets will not lack the skills to appreciate the 
performances.  
Thirdly, the acquisition performance is not positively or negatively related to the time intervals 
(TIME) at any confidence level. There is no significant relationship between time intervals and 
acquisition performances. This finding is inconsistent with the positive relationship founded by 
Hayward (2002). One possible explanation is that the size of acquisitions in the data set of the current 
research includes both large size and small sizes, which is different from the data set of previous 
studies.  
Last but not least, from the multiple regression results of all models in the current thesis, it can 
be noticed that the acquirer to target relatedness (RELATED) plays significant roles in every situation. 
The finding is consistent with the statement of previous studies, saying that firms can generate better 
synergy results when the main businesses of the acquirer and the target are the same or similar. 
Section 2. IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH 
In previous researches of M&A, several topics have been dedicated to understanding the M&A 
performance from the view of acquisition experience. With different geographic locations, time span, 
and industry focus, the effect of acquisition experiences was found to be positive, negative, not 
significant, U-shaped, and inverted U-shaped.  
My finding is in favor of not significant, suggesting that the firms not expect the improvement 
of acquisition performance only by increasing the number of acquisition experiences. With the results 
showing that the similarity of prior experiences and the relatedness between the acquirer to target have 
a positive relationship with the acquisition performance to some extent, my finding suggests 
Taiwanese firms choose the target carefully. Besides, my finding that shows the positive effect of SIM 
can also reconcile with the finding of an inverted U-shaped effect on the ground that Taiwanese 
acquiring firms have less M&A experience than firms in developed countries and they are still on the 
left upward wing of the inverted U-shaped curve. Therefore, Taiwanese firms can still take advantages 
of prior experiences if there is a high similarity of prior experiences. However, firms should spend 
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more time deliberating the similarities and differences between past M&A experiences and the focal 
M&A transaction, and carefully apply knowledge from previous experiences.  
In my research, the complexity of learning from prior acquisition experiences also supports the 
argument that learning by doing effect is not automatic; instead, it is a complicated endeavor (Zollo & 
Singh, 2004). From this point, more effort should be put into the mechanism of how firms learned 
from past acquisitions. My finding can also provide insights into Taiwanese firm managers’ decision-
making. First, in the initial stage of conducting M&A activities, they should try to avoid concluding 
blindly on their own. To achieve favorable synergy effects, managers should take multiple things into 
concern both before and after the M&A transactions. If possible, seeking professional advice may help 
understand the markets and the trends, at the same time preventing them to make massive mistakes.  
Section 3. LIMITATION AND FUTURE STUDIES 
Although this thesis has provided valuable insights, the results should be interpreted in light of 
several limitations. First of all, measuring acquisition performance remains an ongoing challenge in 
acquisition research. In keeping with prior work on acquisitions and the characteristics of empirical 
context, the event study method is used in calculating acquisition performances. However, short-term 
cumulative abnormal stock return reflects the market’s initial reaction to announcement news of the 
acquisition instead of the actual acquisition performances and therefore the validity of this measure is 
dependent on the assumption of efficient market hypothesis.  
Secondly, some variables that may affect the acquisition performance are not included and 
considered in the models of this thesis. Although the models are developed by the reliable previous 
studies and generally consistent with the topic, other factors, such as top management’s cumulative 
acquisition experience, usage of advisers, and method of payment, are believed to impact the 
acquisition performances as well. If time and resource allow, including all possible factors can not 
only improve the predictability of the overall model but also influence the multiple regression results 
of the variable included in this thesis.  
Thirdly, the empirical sample of this thesis has been the M&A transactions completed by 
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Taiwanese public listed acquirers over the period from 2015 to 2019. The selection of public listed 
acquirers may result in the limitations in terms of the ability to generalize the results. On the other 
hand, the sample size of 91 deals is relatively small and can be expended by including either deals 
closed before 2015 or deals that had been announced but not closed yet.  
Furthermore, the data of acquisition experiences (ORGEXP) in this thesis included the data of 
all prior acquisitions since 1990. Shortening the period, such as measuring ORGEXP as the sum of 
the number of acquisitions experienced by the acquirer in 5 years prior to the focal acquisition, may 
improve the sample and result in the different results.  
Researchers in future studies can include more pertinent variables, increase the sample size, 
and try to use the different measurement of acquisition experiences (ORGEXP) to confirm the results 
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